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Abstract
Extortion is a severe obstacle to doing business in many countries, varies both in its frequency
and magnitude across establishments. This paper presents a model of extortion to account for
these features and assess its quantitative effects. In the model, entrepreneur capital is sub-
ject to extortion which affects both the extensive and intensive margins of entrepreneurship.
Despite common property rights, extortion rates arise endogenously and are hump-shaped in
entrepreneur ability. To discipline the quantitative analysis, the model is calibrated to match
establishment-level evidence related to extortion in Poland and yields a number of implications
broadly consistent with establishment-level facts in developing economies. For measures of prop-
erty rights within a plausible range, output losses can be upwards of 10 percent.
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1 Introduction
A large literature has emphasized that how resources are allocated across establishments is impor-
tant for understanding output differences across countries.1 While the literature has examined how
broad, generic policies can be distortionary, understanding the sources of these distortions and how
they materialize remains an active area of research. The focus of this paper is to highlight the
important role that institutions play in enabling and perpetuating distortions that are idiosyncratic
across establishments. I examine a particular class of institutions, namely property rights, their
link to acts of extortion and the implications they have for understanding cross country income
differences.
For the purposes of this paper, I define extortion as “...a racket in which a local strong man
forces merchants to pay tribute in order to avoid damage; damage the strong man himself threatens
to deliver” (Charles Tilly, 1985). Though less common in the western world, both empirical and
anecdotal evidence verify that extortion is a major hindrance to business operation in developing
economies. As shown in Table 1 (see Section 2), extortion is a severe obstacle to doing business,
occurs frequently and varies in magnitude across establishments. Notably, some establishments do
not face extortion, while for others, extortion payments can be as much as 10 percent of annual
sales. Moreover, average extortion payments vary across countries and these payments are inversely
related to indices of property rights. The goal of this paper is to assess the importance of extortion
for understanding resource misallocation and quantify its effect on aggregate output.
To see why output losses can be substantial, consider an environment in which individuals
choose between starting their own enterprise (entrepreneurship) and working for an outside wage,
and where a criminal group (CG) can extort a share of proceeds from entrepreneur production.2
In an environment where there is no opportunity for extortion only the most productive individ-
uals become entrepreneurs and production is at optimal capacity, yielding the first-best outcome.
Conversely, in an environment where extortion is possible, individuals may alter decisions related
to entrepreneurship, both along the extensive and intensive margin. Consider the case when prop-
1See, for example, Restuccia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and Bartelsman et al. (2012).
2Typically, the mafia or criminal organization approaches the potential victim (entrepreneur) and demands a
payment, where failure to comply can result in physical harm or damage to property. I refer to such payments as
extortion. How successful extortion is and the magnitude of the extortion fee depend on the strength of property
rights (for example policing) and the ability of the victim to pay the fee. Related to extortion see Gambetta (1996,
2000), Lotspeich (1997) and Volkov (1999).
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erty rights are imperfect and a CG can extort a share of proceeds from entrepreneur production.
Output and productivity losses can arise due to misallocation and selection. An entrepreneur who
anticipates a high probability of extortion may decrease production to lower potential losses and/or
to become less of a target for extortion. Alternatively, the entrepreneur may increase production
to recoup losses incurred from extortion. In either situation, the marginal product of inputs used
in production will not equal the marginal cost of those inputs, leading to an inefficient outcome.
The second source of output losses can arise through selection into entrepreneurship. In an environ-
ment that features extortion, forward-looking individuals select an occupation accounting for the
possibility of extortion. This decision depends on an entrepreneur’s post-extortion profit, instead
of first-best profit, and thus has the potential to produce distortionary effects along this margin.
To examine the effects of extortion on the aggregate economy, I present a model that accounts
for key features related to extortion, both across and within countries. The model is a variant of
Lucas (1978), where individuals differ in entrepreneurial ability and choose between starting their
own establishment (entrepreneurship) or working for existing establishments (worker). There is a
criminal group (CG) with monopoly power that can extort a share of capital entrepreneurs use
in production. The success of this depends on the strength of property rights and the amount
of protection an entrepreneur buys. The CG observes the entrepreneur’s choice of capital and
protection, and chooses a fraction of capital to extort. A central prediction of the model is that losses
from extortion are hump-shaped across individual ability despite common property rights. High-
ability individuals buy sufficient protection and become less prone to extortion, consistent with the
evidence. Low-ability individuals also face little extortion, but this is because they use little capital
in production. Moderate ability individuals face the most extortion: they use sufficient capital to
warrant extortion by the CG but cannot afford high levels of protection. Variation in extortion
rates imply there are heterogeneous responses to production as inputs are chosen to maximize post-
extortion (or expected) profit. Entrepreneurs who face little extortion produce close to optimal
capacity while entrepreneurs who face high rates of extortion act pre-emptively and produce below
optimal capacity. In economies characterized by weak property rights, extortion rates are higher
and generate larger distortions to production, amplifying the degree of misallocation.
To discipline the quantitative analysis I use data from the World Bank Business Environment
and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 2005. The BEEPS contains establishment-level sur-
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vey data on the frequency and magnitude of payments related to extortion, mostly for countries
in Europe. The calibration of the model is grounded on macro and micro-level evidence related to
extortion in Poland. In particular, the frequency of extortion related activity, the share of extor-
tion across establishments and the aggregate extortion to output ratio are used to pin down key
parameters in the model. Poland is chosen for the calibration because it has the most observations
related to extortion.
In the calibrated model, aggregate capital is 3 percent lower than in the first-best economy (an
economy without extortion) and output is 1 percent lower. This is substantial noting that extortion
accounts for 0.2 percent of aggregate output—a five-fold amplification on output. The model is
then used to consider experiments that lower the value of property rights to match the evidence in
more extortion prone economies (Macedonia, Slovakia, Turkey). Extortion rates observed in these
countries imply output losses in the range of 5− 7 percent and average productivity falls by over 3
percent.
A model of extortion also has key implications for the size distribution of establishments. When
property rights are weak the potential for extortion is higher and entrepreneurs respond by lowering
production. Since capital and labor are complementary in production, lower capital demand reduces
the equilibrium wage. The returns to working falls and individuals trickle into entrepreneurship
raising the fraction of entrepreneurs in the economy.3 Taken together, extortion reproduces several
striking features related to the size distribution of establishments in developing countries: high
rates of entrepreneurship, low productivity and many of these establishments are exceptionally
small (average establishment size can fall upwards of 25 percent). In fact, when property rights
are extremely weak extortion produces a ‘missing middle’ in the size distribution of establishments.
Viewed through the lens of the model, a missing middle exists because extortion induces low to mid
ability entrepreneurs to operate considerably below optimal scale and high ability entrepreneurs,
who are less prone to extortion, operate on a larger scale due to a lower wage.
This paper relates to the literature that examines measured output and productivity losses
that arise from resource misallocation (Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008; Guner et al. 2008; Hsieh
and Klenow 2009; Bartelsman et al. 2012). Previous work has focused on the role that policy
3For example Poschke (2013) and Donovan (2014) show that low ability individuals pursue entrepreneurship often
due to a lack of suitable employment opportunities. See also Gollin (2008).
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distortions can have in misallocating resources.4 A common feature of these distortions are that
they are operative among a sub-set of establishments in the economy. Extortion is distinct in that
it has the potential to affect all establishments either by altering production or the decision to
operate. There is also a growing literature that studies how financial frictions, channeled through
weak property rights, can generate resource misallocation.5 This paper is complementary to that
literature by focusing on the inherent role property rights can have in perpetuating resource misal-
location. It differs, however, by highlighting the importance of extortion for understanding resource
misallocation.
The results in this paper also relate to Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and (2014), who find large gaps
in the marginal product of capital and labor across establishments (in China and India), and that
these establishments exhibit little growth (in India). Extortion can be an important channel for
understanding these features. Entrepreneurs choose capital and labor to maximize post-extortion
profit and since extortion varies by ability, the marginal product of capital and labor differ across
entrepreneurs. Moreover, the capital to labor ratio varies by individual ability and can be up to
20 percent lower in countries that have high extortion rates. Though I do not explicitly model
establishment growth, an implication of the model is that small to mid-size establishments, who
typically generate the bulk of establishment-level growth, are less likely to expand because increasing
their size makes them vulnerable to extortion.
Finally, this work also relates to an earlier literature on extortion/predation.6 A distinction
is that I examine the macroeconomic implications of extortion in a calibrated general equilibrium
model that is disciplined by the recent availability of micro-level data related to extortion. The
model is tractable and quantifies the discriminate impact extortion can have across the size distri-
bution of establishments and on aggregate. Also related is Johnson et al. (2002), and references
therein, who find evidence that weak property rights lead to lower re-investment by establishments
4For policy distortions related to entry costs see Barseghyan and DiCecio (2011), Moscoso Boedo and Mukoyama
(2011), related to firing costs see Poschke (2009) and Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), and related to establishment
size see Guner et al. (2008) and Samaniego (2006).
5See for example Amaral and Quintin (2010), Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang (2010), Buera et al. (2011), Midrigan
and Xu (2014) and Moll (2014) who show that financial frictions can generate considerable productivity losses. Also
related is D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2011) who examine how an informal sector might arise when property rights
are weak.
6Such papers include Murphy et al. (1993), Acemoglu (1995), Grossman and Kim (1995, 1997), Bliss and Ditella
(1997), Konrad and Skaperdas (1998), Choi and Thum (2004) and Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2006). See also Olivella (2010),
who examines government expropriation of firm capital via a contracting problem.
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in several Eastern European countries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some key facts related to
extortion and Section 3 presents a model that can account for these facts. Section 4 is the calibration
of the model and Section 5 presents the quantitative results. Section 6 examines the effects produced
by models with simpler distortions (i.e. taxes) relative to those produced by extortion, and examines
policies that might be implemented to reduce the effects of extortion. Section 7 concludes.
2 Facts related to Extortion
I use data from the World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)
2005 to examine the severity of extortion on businesses. The survey is typically conducted via
face-to-face interviews with a view to understand the major obstacles businesses face in their day-
to-day operation. The 2005 Surveys are particularly relevant because it contains questions related
to extortion at the establishment-level for several countries in Europe (mostly post-Communist
countries). In particular, establishments are asked whether payments to criminal groups are common
in their industry—which I interpret as reflective of an establishment’s own experience with extortion
following Johnson et al. (2002)—and the share of sales it accounts for.7 Establishments are also
asked to rate whether extortion (organized crime/mafia) is an obstacle to business operation and is
coded on a scale of 1 to 4 (possible responses include not a problem, a minor problem, a moderate
problem or a major problem).
Table 1 summarizes the prevalence of extortion for a select group of countries (statistics are
for illustrative purposes and are not particular to the set of countries presented). There are three
main facts that stand-out: extortion occurs frequently, it is an obstacle to doing business, and is
a non-trivial share of sales. For instance, 23 percent of establishments surveyed in Turkey report
incidences related to extortion in the past year, and Slovakia has the highest percentage at 26
percent; in Germany, a country that has strong property rights, only 4 percent of establishments
report incidences related to extortion. Though extortion occurs frequently, how much of a constraint
7The BEEPS 2005 is one of the few, if not only, dataset that contains establishment-level information related to
extortion—more recent surveys do not include questions related to extortion. Establishments are not asked whether
they make payments to criminal groups but rather whether such payments are common in their industry. Given
the nature of such questions—payments to criminal organizations—this is a sensible approach to glean such sensitive
information. See Johnson et al. (2002) for a discussion underlying the merit for this approach.
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Table 1: Extortion in Europe (BEEPS 2005, World Bank)
Faced extortion Obs.to Operate Extortion as % of sales Extortion as % of sales
(%) (%) (avg., all) (avg., if > 0)
Germany 4 7 0.07 0.64
Greece 13 6 0.06 0.90
Hungary 5 6 0.03 1.95
Poland 13 24 0.21 3.43
Portugal 12 35 0.09 0.82
Romania 12 24 0.16 2.53
Russia 17 20 0.29 2.75
Turkey 23 32 0.60 3.15
The BEEPS 2005 contains data related to extortion in over 15 European countries (and a few countries in South East
Asia). This table reports, for select countries in Europe, the prevalence of extortion: the percentage of establishments
that report incidences related to extortion in the past year, the percentage of establishments that report extortion is
a major or moderate obstacle to business operation, and average losses from extortion as percentage of sales, for all
establishments and those establishments that faced extortion. Slovakia and Macedonia and have the highest proportion
of establishments reporting incidences related to extortion (24 − 26 percent). Descriptive statistics are based on the
author’s calculations. Further details are provided in the Appendix.
is it to doing business? The third column in Table 1 provides such evidence by reporting the
percentage of establishments that indicate extortion is a major or moderate obstacle to business
operation.8 In Poland, close to 25 percent of establishments report extortion is a major or moderate
obstacle to business operation, and in Portugal 35 percent of establishments report as such. To put
this in context, in Germany only seven percent of establishments report extortion is a major or
moderate obstacle to business operation. The last two columns in Table 1 report the average
extortion to sales ratio, for the economy as a whole and among establishments that faced extortion.
Extortion is a non-trivial portion of sales, accounting for about 0.3 percent in Russia, and almost 3
percent of sales among establishments that are victims of extortion.
The link between extortion and measures related to property rights is fairly clear. Figure 1 shows
the correlation between country level property rights (as measured by the International Property
Rights Index) and the percentage of establishments that report extortion is a major or moderate
obstacle to doing business. Figure 1 also includes the correlation between GDP per capita (in
logs) and extortion. Not surprisingly, countries where extortion is a bigger obstacle for business
operation are synonymous with weak property rights (correlation of −0.48) and low GDP per capita
(a correlation of −0.51).
8This is an ideal measure for its severity because the potential for extortion can affect establishment behaviour
even though the establishment may not subsequently face extortion. This may explain why values in column 3 exceed
those in column 2.
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Figure 1: This figure plots the correlation between the percentage of establishments that state extortion is a major
or moderate obstacle to business operation against indices related to property rights and GDP per capita (logs).
Table 2: Extortion by Establishment Size
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Faced Ext. Obstacle Ext/Sales Security ($)
All establishments:
Size −0.060∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ 17.56∗∗∗
(0.02249) (0.0166) (0.0224) (1.7167)
Observations 4254 3976 4255 4255
Less than 10 employees:
Size −0.021 0.070∗ −0.053 1.518∗∗∗
(0.0510) (0.0394) (0.0766) (0.3521)
Observations 1803 1684 1803 1803
10 or more employees:
Size −0.071∗∗ −0.042∗ −0.107∗∗∗ 21.14∗∗∗
(0.0514) (0.0244) (0.0321) (2.201)
Observations 2451 2292 2452 2452
Country-level controls Y Y Y Y
Industry-level controls Y Y Y Y
Notes: Each cell reports point estimates from a separate regression. Column (1) and (2) are
results from an Ordered Probit where the dependent variable is whether the establishment has
faced extortion (yes/no) and whether extortion is a non-obstacle, a minor, moderate or major
obstacle to business operation. Marginal effects are significant (results not reported). Column (3)
and (4) are results from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is extortion relative to sales,
and spending on security (equipment, personnel) in dollars. Size is a categorical variable based on
number of employees: For ‘All establishments’, size categories are less than 10, 10 − 49, 50 − 99,
100 − 249 and greater than 249, and for ‘10 or more employees’ the first category is excluded.
For ‘10 or fewer employees’, size categories are less than 4, 4− 7 and 8− 10. The broad patterns
from these regressions are robust to alternate size categories and using number of employees as
a regressor. Results exclude countries that have fewer than 200 establishment-level observations
related to extortion. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
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Next I examine how extortion varies across establishment size within a country. While there
is considerable variation in losses due to extortion across size, a general pattern is that extortion
is less burdensome among large establishments (more than 50 employees) than small and medium
size ones. Table 2 reports regression estimates to illustrate this point, controlling for country
and industry level fixed effects. In Column (1) and (2) the independent variables are whether
an establishment faced extortion and whether extortion is not an obstacle, a minor, moderate or
major obstacle to business operation (Probit regressions); in Columns (3) and (4) the independent
variables are losses due to extortion relative to sales and spending on security (OLS regressions).
The dependant variable, size, is a categorical variable based on number of employees and is robust
to alternate specifications (more details are provided in the table footnote). The first row includes
all establishments and there is a clear negative correlation between size (employees) and measures
related to extortion: as size increases the probability of facing extortion, extortion as an obstacle
to doing business and losses due extortion as a percentage of sales falls. Spending on security rises
with establishment size.
There is also evidence that extortion is less burdensome among very small establishments. This
is shown in the second row of Table 2 which reports estimates for establishments that have fewer
than 10 employees. Notable is that size has a positive coefficient when extortion as an obstacle
to doing business is the dependant variable, implying that very small establishments are not as
severely affected by extortion as larger ones. Spending on protection remains positively correlated
with size among these small establishments. For establishments that have 10 or more employees,
the coefficients on the dependant variables are similar to those reported in the first row and are
significant.
To summarize, there are several key facts related to extortion based on data from the BEEPS
2005. Extortion occurs frequently, is an obstacle for business operation, and its severity is negatively
correlated with property rights. Across the size distribution, incidents related to extortion decreases
with size and protection expenditure rises with size. As an obstacle to doing business, extortion is
initially rising with size and falls thereafter. In what follows, a model that can account for these
broad patterns is presented followed by a quantitative evaluation of its effects.
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3 A Model of Extortion
The model is a variant of Lucas (1978), where individuals differ in entrepreneurial ability and choose
whether to be a worker or entrepreneur. I incorporate extortion into the model in two distinct ways.
First, I introduce a Criminal Group (CG) that optimizes by choosing how much to extort from an
entrepreneur. Second, how much is extorted is intricately related to the level of property rights in
the economy and the amount of protection an entrepreneur buys. Together, these features affect
individual behaviour in regards to entrepreneurship, both along the extensive and intensive margin.
Throughout the paper, I abstract from the provision of protection and those involved in extortion
in order to highlight the effects of extortion on entrepreneur behaviour.
3.1 Environment
There is a measure one of infinitely lived individuals that have heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability,
s ∈ S. Entrepreneur ability is inalienable, constant (i.e. non-stochastic) over time and has a
cumulative distribution µ(s). Since ability is constant, I describe a static version of the environment
noting that subsequent periods are identical.9
Individuals supply one unit of labor inelastically every period and choose between two occu-
pations: operating an individual specific technology as an entrepreneur or working for a wage for
hiring entrepreneurs. Each occupation requires one unit of labor so that individuals can select into
one occupation every period. There exists an exogenous criminal group (CG) that can extort from
entrepreneurs in the economy. I assume that extortion is on entrepreneur capital and that workers
do not face extortion. I do this for two reasons. First, entrepreneur capital is typically tied to a
physical location and can be monitored. Capital therefore serves as a signal for profitability and
because it is tangible, can be used as leverage for extortion.10 Second, the data on extortion is at the
establishment level and so I restrict attention to its effects on entrepreneurs. Moreover, extortion
can occur only among those that have something to extort, which in the model are entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs operate in perfectly competitive markets, rent capital (k) and labor (n) to use in
9I model extortion as a static relationship because there is little evidence to guide how subsequent extortion
payments evolve after an initial payment is made. Since I assume perfectly competitive markets in what follows,
including a stochastic process for productivity will add little to the analysis.
10Whether extortion is on output or capital does not alter the central predictions that follow because there is a
direct mapping from capital to output in the model.
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production taking prices as given. Production is f(s, k, n) and is strictly increasing in each argument.
Entrepreneurs can also buy protection to lower the likelihood of facing extortion (description to
follow). If an individual with ability s becomes an entrepreneur and is not extorted by the CG, her
profit from production is
pi(s, k, n) = f(s, k, n)− wn− (1 + r)k + (1− δ)k
= f(s, k, n)− wn− (r + δ)k, (1)
where w is the wage paid to a worker, r is the real interest rate and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation
rate. If, however, the entrepreneur is extorted by the CG, her profit is
pie(s, k, n) = f(s, k, n)− wn− (1 + r)k + (1− δ − e)k, (2)
= f(s, k, n)− wn− (r + δ)k − ek,
where e ∈ (0, 1) is the fraction of capital extorted by the CG after production has taken place.11
e is the premium entrepreneurs pay for borrowing capital when there is extortion; if e varies by
ability the effective interest rate for borrowing capital (r + δ + e) will also vary.
3.2 Property Rights
Property rights are exogenous, provided by the state and common across individuals within an
economy. I model property rights as a probability, λ ∈ (0, 1), with which the state can prevent
extortion. Higher values of λ represent better legal institutions which decrease the possibility
of extortion. Individuals can supplement the existing level of property rights by buying private
protection z, and thereby further reduce the likelihood of extortion.12 Together with protection,
an individual’s effective rate of protection (ERP) is F (λ, z) ≡ λ + λzθ ∈ [0, 1] where θ > 0 and
z ∈ [0, z].13 The CG successfully extorts capital from an entrepreneur with probability 1− F (λ, z).
11It is assumed the CG’s threat of extortion is credible; in that it is always optimal for the entrepreneur to surrender
the capital demanded by the CG. Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2007) and Konrad and Skaperdas (1997) consider environments
where an illegal organization’s threat of extortion is not credible.
12Protection bought by the entrepreneur is of the legitimate type—legal, private security—and not extortion in
disguise. That is, when entrepreneurs buy protection it is not to ‘buy-off’ the threat of extortion where the payment
ultimately arrives in the hands of the would-be extorter.
13Since the ERP cannot be greater than one, the maximum amount of protection an individual can buy is z =(
1−λ
λ
) 1
θ , which is a non-binding constraint in equilibrium.
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Variation in λ captures cross country differences in potential for extortion and variation in protection
expenditures (holding λ constant) capture differences in vulnerability to extortion within countries.
Finally, when λ = 1 there is no opportunity for extortion, which I refer to as the first-best economy.
The ERP technology I have assumed satisfies four key properties. First, the ERP is increasing
in both property rights and protection. Individuals in economies that have strong property rights
or those that buy more protection are less susceptible to extortion. Second, property rights and
protection are complementary; protection is more effective at reducing extortion when property
rights are stronger. The last two properties imply that F (λ, 0) = λ and F (0, z) = 0. The former
implies that λ is the minimum level of protection an entrepreneur can have and the latter states
that when there is complete anarchy (λ = 0, i.e., no rule of law), protection is ineffective towards
reducing extortion.
3.3 Entrepreneur and Criminal Group Decisions
Timing wise, individuals choose whether to be an entrepreneur or worker.14 Workers supply labor
to hiring entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs make decisions related to production and protection ex-
penditure. The CG perfectly observes this information and chooses a fraction of capital to extort
from each entrepreneur.
Entrepreneur Decisions: Entrepreneurs choose capital and labor in production, and protection
expenditure to limit the possibility of extortion. Since the CG can extort a fraction e ∈ [0, 1] of
capital, capital and labor are chosen to maximize post-extortion profit (or expected profit), pi(s).15
Specifically, the problem of a potential entrepreneur with ability s is
pi(s) = max
k,n≥0
pi(s, k, n), (3)
14I abstract from an individual’s decision to become an extorter for several reasons. The first is a matter of
emphasis. It is well known that CGs extract resources from businesses and the focus of this paper is to understand
how extortion affects entrepreneur behaviour and quantify its effects. For papers that examine the decision to become
an extorter, see Acemoglu (1995), Grossman and Kim (1995, 1997). Second, there is no data available to guide the
quantitative analysis in regards to the population share that engages in extortion related activity and how it varies
across countries. Finally, there is limited understanding on the returns to working in extortion related activity. Note
however, if earnings from becoming an extorter is independent of ability, then in equilibrium those earnings must
equal the wage of a worker—or else all workers will select into the occupation that pays the highest income.
15For exposition the problem is presented as the entrepreneur choosing protection first, followed by capital and
labor. However this set-up is equivalent to the entrepreneur making these decisions simultaneously.
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where
pi(s, k, n) = max
z∈[0,z]
F (λ, z)pi(s, k, n) + (1− F (λ, z))pie(s, k, n)− bz
ψ
ψ
, (4)
= max
z∈[0,z]
pi(s, k, n)− (1− F (λ, z))ek − bz
ψ
ψ
.
Equation (4) states that an entrepreneur is not extorted with probability F (·) and earns profit
pi(s, k, n), and with probability 1 − F (·) is extorted and earns profit pie(s, k, n). This expression
simplifies to imply the entrepreneur earns her full profit from production less the fraction of capital
extorted, e(s) ∈ [0, 1], which occurs with probability 1−F (·). Protection z is chosen to maximize (4)
and has a cost equal to bzψ/ψ, ψ, b > 0, in units of output. Post-extortion profit for an entrepreneur
of type s is denoted by pi(s).
When λ = 1, there is no opportunity for extortion and the model collapses to the first-best case
where capital and labor are chosen to maximize pi(s, k, n) (when λ = 1, z¯ = 0 and 1−F (λ, z) = 0).
However, when λ < 1, capital and labor are chosen maximize post-extortion profit. There is
potential for misallocation and the first-best outcome may be infeasible.
The second channel which generates inefficiency arises through selection—the decision to become
an entrepreneur. Occupation choice for an individual of type s is based on max{pi(s), w}: selection
into entrepreneurship depends on post-extortion profit, instead of first-best profit, and the outside
wage. Inefficiency can arise through the selection channel when occupation choice is altered as a
result of extortion.
The cost function for protection is assumed to be independent of entrepreneur capital. I take
this stance due to the nature of protection being considered, that is, protection with the purpose
of reducing extortion. This sort of protection has much to do with the affiliation and reputation of
the protection provider (i.e. the quality of protection). In much of the extortion related literature,
establishments that are associated with reputable security providers, politicians, or those that have
‘roofs’ are bypassed by groups that engage in extortion.16 Establishments that buy more protec-
tion are in essence buying a stronger association with the security provider and thereby become
less susceptible to extortion. In the equilibrium of the model, protection expenditure is rising in
16While some of these security payments can be extortion payments in disguise, many of them are legitimate, private
forms of security that are not related to extortion. See for example Lotspeich (1997), and references therein, for an
excellent discussion of the prevalence and nature of the extortion racket in Russia.
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establishment size. Nonetheless, in the Appendix I examine a scenario where the cost of buying
protection depends on entrepreneur capital.
Criminal Group Decisions: The Criminal Group has monopoly power and complete information
about entrepreneur capital and protection decisions.17 Extortion is costly since the CG has to spend
time initiating contact, monitoring and collecting extortion rents. The fraction of capital extorted
from an entrepreneur with ability s is chosen to maximize
ΠCG(s) = max
e∈[0,1]
(1− F (λ, z))ke− ae
ρ
ρ
. (5)
The CG successfully extorts a fraction e(s) of entrepreneur capital with probability 1−F (·). While
the CG can extort from every entrepreneur, it is more difficult to do so in economies that have
stronger property rights. Put differently, extortion has limited effect on entrepreneur behaviour
when property rights are strong, but can influence entrepreneur behaviour as property rights weaken
by altering production and/or the need for protection. Within an economy, that is holding λ fixed,
variation in entrepreneur capital and protection imply the severity of extortion will differ across
entrepreneurs. The cost of extorting from an entrepreneur is ae(s)ρ/ρ, ρ, a > 0. As the fraction of
capital extorted increases, more persuasion, monitoring and collection is required, which raises the
cost of extortion for the CG.
The cost function for extortion I have assumed is independent of capital, which implies that it
is equally costly for the CG to extort from a high or low capital entrepreneur. Again, this has much
to do with the nature of extortion. The power to extort is legitimized through the threat of violence
often extending to one’s family. Therefore, I take the stance that entrepreneurs are equally willing
to surrender x percent of their capital to avert violence. (see Appendix for when this assumption is
relaxed). Notwithstanding, these concerns are out-of-equilibrium considerations. In the equilibrium
of the model, high capital entrepreneurs do not pay the most in extortion rents because they buy
sufficient protection and become difficult to extort (see Figure 2).
17The monopoly power assumption is a modelling convenience. Typically, mafia groups operate under the ‘king of
the jungle’ paradigm: the incumbent group battles new entrants with the triumphant group gaining exclusive access
to extortion related activity in the territory. See for example Gambetta (2000). Complete information is to capture
that the CG can gauge the approximate gains from extortion and the difficulty in successfully doing so.
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3.4 Representative household
There is an infinitely lived, representative household that consists of all individuals in the econ-
omy. The household instructs individuals to choose an occupation at the start of the period and
makes consumption and savings decisions at the end of the period. Preferences are over streams of
consumption and are given by
∞∑
t=0
βtU(Ct), (6)
where Ct is aggregate consumption at time t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor and U(·) is the per-
period utility function that has the usual Inada properties. The household is endowed with K0 > 0
units of capital at date t = 0. The per-period budget constraint is
Ct +Kt+1 − (1− δ)Kt ≤ wtN st + Π˜t + (rt + δ)Kt, (7)
whereN s is the measure of individuals that work for entrepreneurs and Π˜ is the sum of post-extortion
profit earned by entrepreneurs. Losses from extortion and costs related to buying protection are
subsumed in Π˜. Since the CG operates as a distinct entity, extortion rents are treated as dead-
weight-loss and not included in the household’s budget constraint.
3.5 Comparative Statics
Given the timing sequence, entrepreneurs choose capital, labor and protection in anticipation of the
CG’s best response for extortion. If θ = ψ(ρ−1)ρ , a closed form solution for protection and extortion
exists and is dependant on entrepreneur ability:
z(s) =
(
Ωρ−1λρ−1(1− λ)k(s)ρ
a+ Ωρ−1λρk(s)ρ
) 1
θ
and e(s) =
(
(1− λ)k(s)
a+ Ωρ−1λρk(s)ρ
) 1
ρ−1
, (8)
where k(s) is capital for an entrepreneur of type s and Ω ≡ θb ρρ−1 = ψb . It follows that z(s) < z,
∀s. From (8) one can verify that as property rights fall, the share of capital extorted rises and en-
trepreneurs respond by buying more protection. Given z(s) and e(s), capital and labor are chosen
to solve (3) (which is determined numerically).
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Proposition 1: Capital and post-extortion profit are non-decreasing in entrepreneur ability which
implies there is an ability threshold s∗ such that individuals with ability s ≥ s∗ select into en-
trepreneurship and all others work for entrepreneurs.
Noting that extortion is on capital, a high ability entrepreneur can choose the same inputs in
production (and protection) as a low ability entrepreneur and earn more from entrepreneurship
since she has higher ability. Hence, a situation where a low ability entrepreneur uses more capital in
production or earns more from entrepreneurship is never an equilibrium outcome. Since the returns
to entrepreneurship are increasing in ability, it follows that there is an ability threshold for selection
into entrepreneurship.
The model also has key implications for how extortion and protection decisions vary across
entrepreneur ability and property rights in an economy. If ρ > 1 and θ > 0, the model implies the
following:
(i) Protection is increasing in entrepreneur ability. Moreover, there is an ability threshold sˆ,
such that entrepreneurs of ability s ≤ sˆ buy protection at an increasing rate and all other
entrepreneurs buy protection at a decreasing rate (i.e. protection is a ‘S-like’ shape in ability).
(ii) There is a critical level of property rights, λc ≡ ρ−1ρ , such that when λ ≥ λc, protection and
property rights are substitutes. When property rights are below this critical level, protection
and property rights are complementary for low ability individuals (those below some threshold)
and substitutes for all others.
(iii) There is an ability threshold sx(λ) such that extortion is increasing in ability for all s ≤ sx(λ)
and decreasing otherwise. Moreover, this ability threshold is decreasing in property rights,
that is ∂sx(λ)∂λ ≤ 0.
These comparative statics are depicted in Figure 2. Here, I focus on the intuition underlying (iii).
When λ = 1, there is no opportunity for extortion and all individuals have an ERP = 1. However,
when λ < 1 extortion is ‘hump-shaped’ in ability and expands outward as property rights fall. This
is driven by the role that protection plays in the model—in an environment without protection,
extortion is non-decreasing in ability. For a given value of property rights, low ability entrepreneurs
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Figure 2: Protection and extortion across individual ability for varying levels of property rights.
use little capital in production which makes them less of a target for extortion. As entrepreneurial
ability increases, capital demand rises which makes extortion more attractive for the CG. However,
high ability entrepreneurs buy sufficient protection (because they are more profitable) which reduces
the potential for the CG to extort them. Moderate ability entrepreneurs, in contrast, cannot afford
as much protection and are most prone to extortion. Hence, misallocation is primarily driven by
these individuals, a topic I return to after describing the equilibrium. Finally, the ability level of
the entrepreneur that faces the most extortion is decreasing in the level of property rights. That
is to say, in economies that have weaker property rights, higher ability entrepreneurs face the most
extortion which raises the degree of misallocation (see Figure 2).
3.6 Equilibrium
I now describe a steady-state, competitive equilibrium for this economy. Many of the features are
standard except for the incorporation of extortion and protection.
A steady-state, competitive equilibrium consists of a distribution over individual ability µ(s), a
decision related to occupation choice, policy functions for entrepreneurs {k(s), n(s), z(s)}, a policy
function for the CG e(s), aggregate levels of consumption (C) and savings (K ′), and prices {w, r},
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such that:
1. given prices, C and K ′ are chosen to maximize (6) subject to the constraint in (7). In a
steady-state, the standard Euler condition implies that r = 1β − 1.
2. given prices, occupation choice is based on max{pi(s), w} and entrepreneurs choose k(s), n(s)
and z(s) to maximize post-extortion profit, as described in (3).
3. the CG group chooses e(s) according to (5).
4. labor, capital and goods market clears
∫
s∗
n(s)dµ(s) =
∫ s∗
s
dµ(s)
∫
s∗
k(s)dµ(s) = K
C + δK + Z + E =
∫
s∗
y(s)dµ(s) ≡ Y
where Z =
∫
s∗
bz(s)ψ
ψ dµ(s), E =
∫
s∗(1−F (λ, z(s)))e(s)k(s)dµ(s), and s∗ is the ability threshold
for selection into entrepreneurship.
Non-standard items are the CG’s choice of extortion and the entrepreneur’s choice of protection. The
goods market clearing condition accounts for aggregate spending on protection (Z) and aggregate
losses from extortion (E). Supply of protection is exogenous in the model and can be assumed to
earn zero profit. CG profit is treated as dead-weight-loss and not included in the goods market.
The equilibrium wage is pinned down by the labor market clearing condition.
3.7 Special Case
To examine explicitly how misallocation arises in the model I consider a special case when ρ = ψ =
b = 2. This simplifies the expressions for protection and extortion, and allows for a characteriza-
tion of entrepreneur capital demand. By substituting values for ρ, ψ and b, the problem for an
entrepreneur simplifies to
pi(s) = max
k,n≥0
pi(s, k, n)− (1− λ)
2k(s)2
a+ λ2k(s)2
. (9)
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Proposition 2: When λ < 1 but not too close to zero, all entrepreneurs, except for the highest
ability ones, choose capital below the optimal level. Moreover, the degree of misallocation is hump-
shaped in individual ability and decreasing in the level of property rights.
To see this, differentiate (9) with respect to capital which yields
∂pi(s)
∂k(s)
− ξ(λ, k) = 0, (10)
MPK = r + δ + ξ(λ, k),
where ξ(λ, k) = 2a(1−λ)
2k(s)
(a+λ2k(s)2)2
≥ 0 is a wedge to renting capital arising from extortion and one that
varies across entrepreneurs. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), there is capital misallocation when
the marginal product of capital (MPK) is not equal to the rental cost of capital. From (10), when
λ < 1, ξ > 0 and the MPK > r+ δ, which implies all but the highest ability entrepreneurs produce
below optimal scale (k → ∞, ξ → 0). Moreover, deviation from optimal scale is hump-shaped
across ability: misallocation of capital rises with ability up to a certain threshold (sx(λ)) and falls
thereafter. These effects are magnified as property rights fall.
4 Calibration
For the quantitative analysis I assume that all parameters are common across countries except for
the one related to property rights, λ. By treating λ as the only source of variation across countries
I am able to isolate and quantify the effects arising from extortion. Of course countries vary along
additional parameters, particularly in relation to technology and the distribution of ability, which
have the potential to amplify the effects implied by a model of extortion.
I calibrate the model in two stages. First, I treat the US as the first-best economy and calibrate a
set of standard parameters to the US economy. In the second stage, I hold the calibrated parameters
in the US constant and calibrate the remaining parameters—those related to extortion—to match
key moments related to extortion in Poland.
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4.1 Preference and Technology Parameters
In regards to the parameterization of the model, I follow the standard practise in the literature where
possible. For the entrepreneurial production technology, I assume that f(s, k, n) = s(kαn1−α)1−v,
where 1−v is the span of control parameter, the share of output going to inputs used in production.
Of this share, α is the share going to capital and 1−α is the share going to labor. I assume ability
is Pareto distributed and has a distribution µ(s) = 1 − s−η, where η controls the dispersion over
ability.
There are 11 parameters to calibrate: five related to preferences and technology {β, δ, α, v, η}
and six related to extortion {λ, ρ, ψ, a, b, θ}. I calibrate the former set of parameters to match
key features in the US, which serves as the first-best economy where property rights are perfect
(i.e. λ = 1). When λ = 1, both protection and extortion are zero irrespective of the values for
{ρ, ψ, a, b, θ}. Therefore, I can calibrate the model to the US where standard parameters are well
established in the literature, without having to take stance on parameters related to extortion.18
The discount factor β is chosen to target a four percent real return. As is standard in the
literature, I set α = 1/3 and the depreciation rate to six percent (i.e. δ = 0.06). The remaining
parameters, v and η, are jointly calibrated to match two relevant moments in the US: the income
share going to the top five percent of earners, which is about 30 percent as per The World Top Income
Database in 2002; and the fraction of entrepreneurs (FOE) in the economy, a critical variable in the
analysis that follows, which is 10 percent.19 Table 3 presents moments from the model and US data,
and the last column reports the parameter most closely associated with the targeted moment. The
model does reasonably well in matching other moments that are not targeted in the calibration,
including the capital to output ratio (2.4), the employment share among the top 30 percent of
establishments (53 percent) and the output share among the top 5 percent of establishments (40
percent).
18This is not to say the US is an extortion free economy but rather due to a lack of establishment level data. The
BEEPS primarily focuses on developing economies and data related to extortion is mainly for European countries.
19Cagetti and De Nardi (2006) show that the share of entrepreneurs in the US economy can range from 7 − 17
percent depending on the criteria used to define an entrepreneur. Active business owners, which is the relevant group
for extortion, is about 11.5 percent. I chose a target equal to 10 percent to take a conservative stance (a higher
fraction of entrepreneurs in the first-best economy imply larger effects from extortion).
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Table 3: Calibration: US Economy
Target Moments US Data Model Parameter
Income share (top 5%) 0.30 0.30 v = 0.26
FOE 0.10 0.10 η = 3.75
4.2 Parameters related to Extortion
To pin down parameters related to extortion I use data from the BEEPS 2005. The survey includes
information related to key parameters in the model: (i) whether payments are made to organized
crime to avert violence or property damage, and if yes, the percentage of sales it accounts for, (ii)
whether payments are made for private security, and if yes, what percentage of sales it accounts for.
I use the former as a proxy for the frequency of and losses attributable to extortion and the latter
as a proxy for protection expenditures. This provides a guide for how extortion and protection
varies across establishments and its share relative to output, key micro and macro statistics used
to discipline the quantitative analysis. The Appendix contains a more in-depth discussion of the
dataset and its relevance to the model.
Since λ is treated as the only source of variation across countries, I hold the calibrated parameters
from Section 4.1 fixed and calibrate the remaining parameters to match key features related to
extortion and protection in Poland. I choose Poland because it has the most observations related
to extortion (though not the country most prone to extortion in the data).20
There remain six parameters determine: the measure of property rights (λ), the cost of extortion
for the CG (ρ and a), the cost of buying protection (ψ and b), and the complementarity between
protection and property rights (θ). These parameters are jointly calibrated to match a set of relevant
moments related to protection expenditures and extortion. Even though these parameters affect
the value of all moments, each moment is primarily influenced by a particular parameter(s), as I
explain below.
Property rights, λ, is a critical parameter that affects the likelihood of extortion. In the model,
the probability an entrepreneur faces extortion is 1 − F (λ, z(s)). Higher values of λ reduce the
20There are over 700 establishments surveyed in Poland, the second most in the dataset, of which about 13 percent
report incidences related to extortion. Germany has the most establishments surveyed in the dataset but has too few
observations related to extortion. There are several countries that have a higher percentage of establishments that
report incidences related to extortion than in Poland—e.g. Bosnia, Macedonia, Slovakia, Turkey—but they have too
few observations (less than 200) to use for the calibration.
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Table 4: Parameters related to extortion – Polish economy
Target Moments Data Model Parameter
Avg. extortion rate 0.130 0.130 λ = 0.52
Extortion share (top decile) 0.135 0.128 ρ = 1.54
Extortion to Output ratio 0.002 0.002 a = 31.4
Protection share (top decile) 0.510 0.510 ψ = 1.75
Protection to Output ratio 0.004 0.004 b = 2.04
(Extortion+Protection)/Output (top 50%) 0.006 0.006 θ = 0.20
Non-targeted Moments: Data Model
Extortion share (top 20%) 0.34 0.34
Extortion share (top 30%) 0.53 0.51
Protection share (top 30%) 0.83 0.84
Protection share (top 50%) 0.95 0.93
(Extortion+Protection)/Output (top 20%) 0.005 0.006
Output share (top 10%) 0.61 0.54
Notes: Calibration targets are from the BEEPS 2005. Deciles are based on establishment
size (employees).
likelihood of extortion and lower values increase its likelihood. Therefore, the probability of facing
extortion is primarily affected by λ. Based on the BEEPS 2005, about 13 percent of establishments
in Poland faced extortion, which is used to pin down λ. θ also influences the probability of extortion
by affecting the returns to protection spending through its complementarity with property rights.
I therefore choose θ to target the total distortion (extortion + protection) relative to sales among
the top 50 percent of establishments (measured by employees). The parameters for the extortion
cost function are ρ and a which affect how much is extorted by the CG. ρ is the elasticity term
that controls how increasingly costly it is to extort a larger share of entrepreneur capital and a
has a level effect on the cost. ρ is therefore useful to target the share of extortion among the top
decile of entrepreneurs (14 percent) and a is useful to target the aggregate extortion to output ratio
(0.002). The parameters related to protection expenditures are ψ and b which control how much
entrepreneurs spend on protection. ψ is the elasticity parameter which affects how increasingly
costly it is to buy protection and b has a level effect on the cost. Therefore, ψ and b are chosen to
target the share of protection spending among the top decile of entrepreneurs (51 percent) and the
aggregate protection to output ratio (0.004).
Table 4 presents target moments from the model and data, and accompanying parameter values.
The property rights value in Poland is λ = 0.52 which implies that without protection expenditure
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the average extortion rate is 48 percent (1−λ). Protection plays a crucial role in the model as after
accounting for protection expenditure the average extortion rate falls to 13 percent. The elasticity
for the cost functions for extortion and protection imply that both are increasingly costly (ρ > 1,
ψ > 1). The scale parameter for the extortion cost function is sufficiently high (a = 20) to ensure
a low aggregate extortion to output ratio. Overall the model does well in matching the target
moments as well as other moments that are not targeted in the calibration. For instance, the model
does remarkably well in matching extortion and protection shares across various deciles in the size
distribution, as well as its sum relative to sales.
5 Results
I now evaluate the quantitative implications of extortion. In the experiments I consider, all pa-
rameters are held fixed except for the one related to property rights. Varying the level of property
rights affects the probability of facing extortion and thus highlights the importance of this channel
on entrepreneur behaviour and its aggregate implications. I begin by discussing the effects across
entrepreneurs and then discuss the aggregate implications of the model.
5.1 Individual-level effects
Figure 3 shows the effects of extortion across individuals and across economies for select values of
property rights: the first-best economy (λ = 1), the calibrated economy for Poland (λPol = 0.52) and
λ = 0.45. The top row depicts the effective rate of protection, which is increasing in entrepreneur
ability and property rights, and expected losses from extortion as percentage of output, is hump-
shaped in entrepreneur ability and expands outward as property rights fall.21 These effects are
similar to the discussion in Section 3.5, and so here I focus on the effects of extortion on capital
demand (second row of Figure 3).
When λ < 1, extortion induces entrepreneurs to produce below optimal capacity where the
MPK > r+δ (high ability entrepreneurs use more capital in production than individuals of similar
ability in the first-best economy due to a lower equilibrium wage). Entrepreneurs who expect
significant losses from extortion, typically those of moderate ability, act pre-emptively and choose
21The hump-shape feature holds for the fraction of capital extorted e(s), the expected fraction of capital extorted
e(s)(1− ERP ) and expected losses from extortion e(s)(1− ERP )k(s).
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Figure 3: This figure plots the effects of extortion across individuals for select values of property rights
capital considerably below the optimal level (Figure 4 includes economies that have lower property
rights where these effects are more noticeable). Heterogeneous responses to capital demand imply
the capital to labor ratio varies across entrepreneurs and is below the first-best value. In particular,
the capital to labor ratio is inversely related to extortion: entrepreneurs that anticipate highest
rates of extortion have the lowest capital to labor ratios in production. As property rights decrease
these effects are amplified.
These effects have implications for the size distribution of establishments as well. As shown
in Figure 4, when λ = 0.4 extortion produces an economy with a dis-proportionally high number
of small establishments (measured in capital, but also holds for labor since production technology
is complementary in both inputs). In fact, when property rights are extremely weak, extortion
generates a size distribution that exhibits a ‘missing middle’. This is because the majority of
entrepreneurs operate at an exceptionally small scale while the very high ability entrepreneurs, who
face little extortion, operate as mega-size establishments due to a low equilibrium wage.
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Figure 4: Property rights, extortion and capital demand
5.2 Aggregate Effects
Table 5 presents the effects of extortion on aggregate variables for select values of λ. All variables,
except for the last two rows, are presented relative to the first-best economy (λ = 1). I begin
with the calibrated economy for Poland. When λPol = 0.52, the average extortion rate is 13
percent. Entrepreneurs use less capital in production which lowers aggregate capital by 3 percent
and aggregate output by 1 percent. This is substantial noting that extortion accounts for two-tenths
of a percent of aggregate output in the calibrated economy—a five-fold amplification on output.
Consumption falls by 1 percent since resources are now allocated to cover protection expenditure.
There are no effects along the extensive margin as the fraction of entrepreneurs (FOE) remains
unchanged, which implies average establishment productivity is also unaltered. Average capital to
labor ratio is 3 percent lower.
The effects of extortion in the calibrated economy are modest because the most productive
entrepreneurs, who account for the majority of production, become immune to extortion by spending
on protection. What are the quantitative effects in economies where the potential for extortion is
higher? To evaluate this, I lower the value for property rights λ—which increases the potential
for extortion—while holding all other parameters from the calibration fixed. This experiment can
be viewed as the effects of extortion in Poland from an exogenous change in property rights that
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Table 5: Quantitative effects from Extortion
Variable λPol = 0.52 λ = 0.45 λ = 0.4 λ = 0.35
Capital 0.97 0.85 0.62 0.44
Output 0.99 0.96 0.88 0.78
Consumption 0.99 0.95 0.86 0.80
FOE 1.00 1.07 1.28 1.58
Avg. productivity 1.00 0.98 0.94 0.89
Avg. capital/labor ( kn) 0.97 0.85 0.64 0.46
Avg. size (n) 1.00 0.93 0.76 0.59
Avg. extortion rate 13% 22% 32% 41%
Extortion-Output ratio 0.002 0.010 0.025 0.038
Notes: This table reports the effects of extortion on variables of interest for economies
that differ across values of λ. All results, except for the last two rows, are presented
relative to the first-best economy (λ = 1).
leaves other factors/parameters unchanged, or in a broader context, the importance of extortion for
understanding cross-country income differences if property rights are a key dimension along which
countries vary.
As shown in Table 5, a general pattern is that as property rights fall, extortion becomes more
severe and is reflected through larger decreases in aggregate output, capital and consumption, as well
as average establishment size (employees), capital to labor ratio and productivity. The λ = 0.45
economy is particularly relevant because it closely resembles extortion in Turkey—based on the
BEEPS 2005 the average extortion rate is 21 percent and extortion as a share of output is 0.6
percent in Turkey, close to the values in the λ = 0.45 economy. Treating λ as the only source of
variation across countries, extortion lowers output in Turkey by 4 percent, average establishment
size and average capital to labor ratio by 7 and 15 percent.
As property rights are lowered a model of extortion also replicates several striking features re-
lated to the establishment size distribution in poor countries: high rates of entrepreneurship that
are characterized by exceptionally small scales of operation and low productivity. For instance,
when λ = 0.35 (an economy that has 3 times the probability of facing extortion that Poland has),
the threshold for entry into entrepreneurship falls raising the fraction of entrepreneurs by close to
60 percent. The reason for this is as follows: When property rights are weak, extortion is ubiqui-
tous which induces entrepreneurs to use minimal capital in production.22 Since capital and labor
22This is also why aggregate variables decrease at a faster rate as property rights fall. When property rights are
reasonably strong (say λPol) entrepreneurs need only limited protection to produce close to optimal scale. As property
rights fall, and noting that protection and property rights are complementary, the amount of protection required to
26
are complementary in production, demand for labor falls driving down the equilibrium wage. As
a result, more individuals, specifically those of lower ability, select into entrepreneurship due to a
weak outside option. Average productivity falls by 11 percent, average establishment size by 40
percent, and average capital to labor ratio by 54 percent.
Assessing values for property rights: The model generates substantial losses in output and produc-
tivity for values of λ ≤ 0.45. Are values for λ in this range consistent with evidence? The approach
I take is to find the value of λ that can rationalize the frequency of extortion observed in countries
that data is available for. The BEEPS dataset provides establishment-level data related to extor-
tion in over 15 countries. In Europe, Macedonia and Slovakia report the highest incidences related
to extortion (24 − 26 percent) and it accounts for about 1 percent of aggregate output.23 Values
for λ between 0.44 − 0.45 generate extortion rates in this range with output losses of 5 percent in
Macedonia and 7 percent in Slovakia. Cambodia reports the highest incidences related to extortion
at 32 percent. As shown in Table 5, λ = 0.4 generates this statistic implying output losses of 12
percent and average establishment size and productivity that is 24 and 6 percent lower.
Countries in Africa, particularly Sub-Saharan Africa, are also an obvious consideration since
they are characterized by a history of poor institutions and weak ‘rule of law’ (Acemoglu et al.,
2001). In fact, most measures related to property rights or institutional development consistently
rank African countries at the lower end of the spectrum (see for example the International Property
Rights Index or the property rights and ruled-based governance index by the World Bank). While
the BEEPS dataset does not contain data related to extortion in these countries, it does contain
establishment-level data related to theft, robbery, vandalism and arson (henceforth crime). Using
a broader interpretation of extortion to include crime, the probability of facing extortion can range
from 30−50 percent with extortion to output ratios between 1.8−2.7 percent (Cameroon, Botswana
and Lesotho). Using the model, values of λ between 0.45− 0.35 are consistent with these facts and
imply output losses as much as 20 percent in these countries.
operate close to optimal scale cannot be profitably incurred by many entrepreneurs.
23The number of observations is limited however— about 150 and 100 establishments are surveyed in Slovakia and
Macedonia.
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6 Discussion
Extortion distorts entrepreneur behaviour by affecting production and selection into entrepreneur-
ship. The focus of this section is to examine the importance of extortion for understanding mis-
allocation. First, I compare the quantitative effects implied by a model of extortion relative to a
model that features a simpler distortion: a proportional tax on the rental cost of capital. Second, I
examine the effects of a redistribution policy that aims to undo the effects of misallocation created
by extortion.
6.1 Extortion and taxes on capital: Quantitative comparison
Extortion serves as an implicit tax on the cost of renting capital. To assess the importance of
extortion for understanding resource misallocation, I compare its quantitative effects relative to a
model that has an explicit tax on the rental cost of capital. The tax is the only distortion in the
economy (λ = 1). The problem of the establishment is
pi(s) = max
k,n≥0
f(s, k, n)− wn− (r + δ + τk(s)) k, (11)
where τk(s) is the tax rate imposed on an entrepreneur of type s. I examine two policies where
the tax is related to the effective rate of extortion (x(s) ≡ e(s)[1 − F (λ, z(s))]) an entrepreneur
faces in the extortion economy when λ = 0.45. The effective rate of extortion is the percentage
of capital an entrepreneur can expect to lose from extortion, or alternatively, the additional cost
of renting capital due to extortion. In the first policy, I set the tax equal to the average, effective
extortion rate τk(s) = x¯ ∀s (i.e. homogenous across entrepreneurs) and in the second policy, the
tax is heterogeneous and set equal to τk(s) = x(s).
Table 6 presents the results for the tax economy under the two policies, as well as the extortion
economy when λ = 0.45 (where there are no taxes) for comparison. Results are presented relative
to the first-best economy (λ = 1 and τk(s) = 0 ∀s). Under the first policy, the tax is homogeneous
across entrepreneurs and equal to 0.57 percent (0.0057). The tax lowers aggregate capital, output
and consumption but not to the same extent as in the extortion economy.24 Recall, when λ < 1
24Since I treat extortion as a dead weight loss, for consistency, I assume the aggregate value of the tax is not rebated
back to the household.
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Table 6: Extortion and taxes on capital
Extortion Economy Policy 1 Policy 2
λ = 0.45 τk = x¯ τk(s) = x(s)
Capital 0.848 0.931 0.938
Output 0.959 0.980 0.986
Consumption 0.946 0.974 0.979
Notes: This table compares the effects of extortion when λ = 0.45 relative to two
tax policies on capital applied in an economy where there is no extortion (λ = 1).
In Policy 1 the tax is homogeneous across entrepreneurs and equal to the average,
effective rate of extortion, and in Policy 2 the tax is heterogeneous and equal to the
effective rate of extortion. Results are presented relative to the first-best economy.
extortion is more distortionary for moderate ability entrepreneurs than high ability entrepreneurs.
Moderate ability entrepreneurs are therefore better off in the tax economy than in the extortion
economy while high ability entrepreneurs are worse off in the tax economy.
For Policy 2, the tax on capital is heterogeneous across entrepreneurs (τk(s) = x(s)). This
policy has a lesser effect on capital, output and consumption than the first policy. Even though the
tax is heterogeneous and chosen to equal the effective rate of extortion, the model predicts about
one-third of the output losses predicted in the extortion economy. This heterogeneous tax misses
the full distortionary effect arising from extortion in an important way: it does not account for
the additional costs (in this instance, protection) that entrepreneurs incur to avert the distortion
they encounter (in this instance, extortion). This points to the importance of examining particular
distortions in isolation as they can highlight strategic effects that generic taxes overlook.25 This is
particularly relevant for policies that aim to compensate or undo the effects arising from a particular
distortion, as I show next.
6.2 Tax policy in an extortion economy
Extortion has unequal effects across entrepreneurs. Mid-ability entrepreneurs are the most con-
strained by extortion and they pre-emptively produce below optimal capacity, while production for
high ability entrepreneurs is not as severely affected by extortion. Outside of improving property
rights, I consider whether two specific tax/subsidy policies—both revenue neutral—can reduce the
overall burden of extortion in the λ = 0.45 economy. The first is a redistributive policy related to
25A homogenous tax rate that generates the same aggregate stock of capital as in the extortion economy is τ = 0.0135
or (1.35 percent). However, this tax cannot reproduce key differences at the micro-level, particularly in relation to
output shares across entrepreneurs, establishment size distribution and selection into entrepreneurship.
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the rental cost of capital (Policy A): the top 10 percent of entrepreneurs face a tax on the rental
cost of capital and all other entrepreneurs, with a view to increase production, receive a subsidy.
In the second policy (Policy B), entrepreneur profit is taxed and the cost of buying protection is
subsidized, at rates that are common across all entrepreneurs.26
Table 7 presents the results relative to the first-best economy. The second column presents the
extortion economy when λ = 0.45 absent of a tax policy, and the last two columns present the two
tax policies applied to this economy. For Policy A, I set the capital tax equal to five percent for
the top ten percent of entrepreneurs—for the policy to be revenue neutral a 2 percent subsidy for
renting capital is provided to all remaining entrepreneurs. This policy fails considerably: aggregate
capital, output and consumption are lower under the policy than without. This is due to the unique
feature of an extortion economy which amplifies the effects of a tax on high ability entrepreneurs
and mitigates the benefits of a subsidy on low/moderate ability entrepreneurs. When the tax
is applied to the top decile of entrepreneurs it lowers profit and therefore how much protection
is bought, which raises the potential for extortion. As a result, these entrepreneurs respond by
using less capital in production, increasing the degree of misallocation among the most productive
entrepreneurs. The subsidy provided to the remaining entrepreneurs increases demand for capital,
but marginally. These entrepreneurs still cannot afford sufficient protection to prevent extortion,
and despite the subsidy continue to produce at a low scale.
Policy B presents the scenario where the cost of buying protection is subsidized by 25 percent
for all entrepreneurs. To ensure the policy is revenue neutral, all entrepreneurs pay a tax on profit
equal to 1.75 percent. The subsidy increases the capacity for entrepreneurs to buy protection which
reduces the potential for extortion. This policy raises aggregate capital, output and consumption,
and because the tax is applied to entrepreneur profit there is minimal distortion to capital demand.
I also examine whether further increases to the subsidy can steer the economy closer towards the
first best economy. This does not happen because as the subsidy rises so does the tax on profit to
ensure the policy is revenue neutral. There is a threshold, where sustained increases in the subsidy
(with accompanying increases in the tax rate) lowers spending on protection due to declining profit
26The problem for the entrepreneur becomes,
pi(s, k, n) = max
z∈[0,z]
(1− τpi)pi(s, k, n)− (1− F (λ, z))ek − (1− τs) bz
ψ
ψ
,
where τpi, τsub ∈ (0, 1) is the tax on profit and subsidy for buying protection.
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Table 7: Tax policy in the extortion economy, λ = 0.45
No tax policy Policy A Policy B
Capital 0.85 0.77 0.87
Output 0.96 0.92 0.97
Consumption 0.95 0.92 0.95
τ taxk — 5% —
τ subk — 2% —
τpi — — 1.75%
τs — — 25%
This table presents the results for two revenue neutral, govern-
ment tax policies that aim to undo the effects of misallocation
in the λ = 0.45 economy. Policy A taxes the rental cost of capi-
tal at 5 percent for the top decile of entrepreneurs and uses the
proceeds to subsidize all other entrepreneurs. Policy B applies a
uniform subsidy for buying protection which is funded through
a uniform tax on profit. All results are relative to the first-best
economy.
and undoes the increase in capital demand.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper presents a model of extortion to highlight its effects on entrepreneur behaviour, both
along the extensive and intensive margins. The model makes key predictions—extortion is hump-
shaped across establishment size, increases as property rights weaken, and protection spending rises
with size—that are broadly consistent with the evidence. An implication of the model is that in
economies characterized by weak property rights, entrepreneurs strategically produce below optimal
scale to negate the threat of extortion. The quantitative analysis is guided by establishment-level
data related to extortion in Poland and predicts fairly modest aggregate effects but considerable
heterogeneous effects along size distribution of establishments. Using the model to rationalize the
frequency of extortion in more extortion plagued economies can imply output losses in the range
of 5 − 10 percent. Importantly, extortion has key effects along size distribution, lowering average
establishment productivity, size and capital to labor ratio by as much as 5, 25 and 35 percent.
Property rights play a critical role in influencing entrepreneur behaviour. While they are treated
as exogenous in the model, property rights are persistent over time, evolve gradually and require
resources to sustain or improve their quality. From the perspective of a benevolent government,
taxes must be collected to maintain or improve property rights. In a model of extortion a government
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faces a dilemma: raising taxes distort establishment behaviour but can benefit establishments in
the long-run if used to improve property rights. It naturally follows to ask whether a tax used to
fund improvements in property rights is welfare improving. While an in-depth analysis of such a
question is beyond the scope of this paper, I offer several insights based on the model presented in
Section 3.
Consider the case where a proportional tax on profit is imposed on all individuals in an ex-
tortion economy and are used improve property rights. Improved property rights benefit all en-
trepreneurs but taxes will have heterogeneous effects because the severity of extortion varies across
entrepreneurs. Based on the model, high-ability entrepreneurs can be made worse off through higher
extortion rates because taxes lower the profit margin and the ability to buy protection. These ef-
fects can be especially severe and have dynamic implications if improving property rights is a slow
process. In contrast, low-ability entrepreneurs buy little protection and face high rates of extor-
tion, especially if they produce at optimal capacity. Improved property rights can outweigh the tax
burden on profit since production is quite low among these individuals.
The welfare gains from a tax used to fund property rights will depend on the existing level of
property rights and whether government takes a short or long run view to improving welfare. A
country’s initial level of property rights is crucial for determining this. For instance, in countries
where property rights are moderate, distortions created by taxes maybe short-lived if improvements
in property rights are prompt and enable the economy to operate extortion-free in the future.
Conversely, in countries where property rights are weak, the taxes required maybe too onerous
and improvement in property rights too gradual that short run costs may exceed long run gains,
trapping these economies in a cycle of inferior property rights.
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Appendices
A Derivations
Closed-form solution for protection: Substituting the CG’s best-response function for extortion into
equation (4) and maximizing with respect to z yields,
az(ψ−θ)(ρ−1) + Ωρ−1λρkρzθ = Ωρ−1λρ−1(1− λ)kρ.
A closed form solution for z exists when θ = ψ(ρ−1)ρ . When a ≥ 0, which holds by assumption,
z∗(s) ≤ z ∀s.
Proof of Proposition 1: Consider the case when pi(s1) < pi(s2), where s1 > s2. Noting that z(s)
and e(s) are functions of k(s), and that pi(s) is increasing in ability, an entrepreneur of type s1 can
choose k = k(s2) and n = n(s2) and earn a post-extortion profit of pi ≥ pi(s2). Hence, pi(s1) < pi(s2)
is never an equilibrium outcome.
Comparative statics:
(i) If capital is increasing in ability, it follows that ∂z(s)∂s ≥ 0. Protection is increasing at a faster
rate in individual ability when ∂
2z(s)
∂s∂s > 0, which is true when (ρ− θ)a− θΩρ−1λρk(s)ρ(1 + ρ) > 0 or
alternatively, when ρ > θ and k(s) is small. ∂
2z(s)
∂s∂s > 0 for all individuals with ability s < ŝ, where
ŝ = k−1
([
(ρ−θ)a
θ(1+ρ)Ωρ−1λρ
] 1
ρ
)
, and less than or equal to zero, otherwise.
(ii) This requires examining how protection varies with property rights. When λ ≥ ρ−1ρ ≡ λc,
∂z(s)
∂λ ≤ 0 ∀s, implying protection and property rights are substitutes. When λ < λc, ∂z(s)∂λ ≤ 0 for
individuals with ability s ≥ k−1
([
a(ρ−λρ−1)
Ωρ−1λρ
] 1
ρ
)
, and positive otherwise.
(iii) ∂e(s)∂s ≥ 0 ∀s ≤ sx and decreasing otherwise, where sx ≡ a(ρ−1)Ωρ−1λρ . Differentiating sx with
respect to λ implies ∂sx∂λ < 0.
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Proof of Proposition 2: ξ(λ, k) > 0 when λ < 1, implying the MPK > (r+δ). ∂ξ(λ,k)∂λ < 0, implying
that as property rights decrease the degree of misallocation rises. Finally, ∂ξ(λ,k)∂s is positive for
values of k below a threshold k¯ and decreasing otherwise.
B Extortion and Protection functional forms
In Section 3.3 the cost functions for buying protection and extortion are independent entrepreneur
capital. I now examine the effects when costs associated with protection and extortion are dependant
on capital. The problem of the entrepreneur becomes:
p˜i(s) = max
k,n≥0
pˆi(s, k, n),
where
pˆi(s, k, n) = max
z∈[0,z¯]
pi(s, k, n)− (1− λ− λzθ)ek − bz
ψg(k)
ψ
,
and the problem of the CG becomes
Π(s) = max
e∈[0,1]
(1− λ− λzθ)k(s)e(s)− ae
ρg(k)
ρ
,
where h(k) and g(k) are functions increasing in k. When a closed form solution for protection exists
(i.e. when θ = ψ(ρ−1)ρ ), optimal protection and extortion decisions are:
z(s) =
(
λρ−1Ωρ−1(1− λ)kρ
ag(k)h(k)ρ−1 + λρΩρ−1kρ
) 1
θ
e(s) =
(
(1− λ)h(k)ρ−1k
ag(k)h(k)ρ−1 + λρΩρ−1kρ
) 1
ρ−1
Table 8 shows how protection and extortion varies by individual ability for various functional forms
considered. h(k) = g(k) = 1 is the environment in Section 3.3. In the second column the cost
of protection and extortion are linear in capital. In this setting, extortion and protection are
a constant value that does not vary across entrepreneurs. Finally, the last column considers a
case where the cost of protection and extortion are non-linear in capital; in particular b (zk)
ψ
ψ and
a (ek)
ρ
ρ . Under strict conditions extortion is hump-shaped in individual ability and when these
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conditions are relaxed, extortion is decreasing in ability. Protection is always decreasing ability.
Given the functional forms, the parameterization of h(k) = g(k) = 1 is most consistent with the
evidence—protection expenditure is increasing in size and extortion is less burdensome among small
and large establishments.
Table 8: Protection and Extortion functional forms
f(k) = g(k) = 1 f(k) = g(k) = k f(k) = kψ, g(k) = kρ
z(s) ↑ in s constant in s ↓ in s
e(s) hump-shape in s constant in s ↓ or hump-shape in s
C Data
The data I use is from the Word Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey
(BEEPS) 2005. The 2005 wave is particularly relevant because it includes questions related to ex-
tortion—subsequent waves focus on questions related to crime, in part due to a higher response rate,
and have omitted questions pertaining to extortion. The survey is conducted among establishments
that have between 2 and 10,000 employees. About 45 percent of establishments surveyed have fewer
than 10 employees and 75 percent of establishments have fewer than 50 employees. Establishments
are classified as either Industry (mining, construction and manufacturing) or Service (transport,
trade, real estate, restaurant/hotels, and other services) and they each account for about half of
the observations.
Establishments are asked whether firms in their line of business make payments to organized
crime to prevent violence or property damage, which I treat as an establishment’s own experience
with extortion, and what share of sales it accounts for. This is a round-about and sensible way to
ascertain such sensitive information and ensure adequate response. See Johnson et al. (2002) who
argue for the merit of this approach using an earlier version of the survey.
For the statistics in Table 1, the probability of facing extortion is determined by calculating the
percentage of establishments that report facing extortion in the last year. Establishments are also
asked to rate whether organized crime/mafia is a major, moderate, minor or non obstacle to business
operation (question q54s). This question gets at the direct and indirect effects of extortion—an
establishment may not face extortion but may still be adversely affected by it. Table 1 reports the
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percentage of establishments that state extortion is a major or moderate obstacle to operation. In
reporting these statistics I exclude establishments that do not report sales data or use capital in
production since this information maps closely to the model. I also exclude establishments that
were deemed untruthful in their responses by the interviewer. The last two columns report average
extortion as a percentage of sales, among all establishments and those who faced extortion, by
country. For sales I use value added sales. I also exclude establishments that are in the top two
percent in sales, losses due to extortion and protection spending to remove outliers. The calibration
targets exclude these outliers as well.
For the regression results reported in Table 2, industry-level fixed effects are based on the eight
classifications noted above. Only countries that have more than 200 establishment-level observations
are included: Armenia, Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, Portugal Romania, Russia, Turkey and
Ukraine. Germany, which has the most observations, is excluded because it would account for about
1/3 of all observations. However, the general patterns reported in the table are consistent when
Germany and/or countries that have fewer than 200 observations (Bosnia, Macedonia, Slovakia and
Slovenia) are included.
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